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DMARC aggregate report: how to read it and what to do next

A DMARC aggregate report is a daily XML summary of mail using your domain. Read each field, find failing senders and fix them before you enforce.

Before you start

A DMARC aggregate report is an XML file that a receiving mail server sends to the address in your rua tag, usually once a day. It counts the messages that used your domain, grouped by sending IP address, and shows their SPF (authorized servers), DKIM (message signature) and DMARC results.

You need:

  • A DMARC record with a rua tag. Without rua, receivers must not generate reports. A minimal TXT record, published at _dmarc.example.com:

    TXT
    v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

    Caution: if a record already exists, edit it and keep its p value. When one name has two DMARC records, receivers discard both.

  • A dedicated mailbox or reporting service. An address on another registered domain also needs a permission record on that domain.

  • A list of the services that send as your domain, to compare against each report.

A report typically covers one UTC day, so allow at least one full UTC day after you publish rua.

Steps

How to read a DMARC report

This shortened report follows the RFC 9990 format. Names and numbers are examples.

<feedback xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0">
  <report_metadata>
    <org_name>Receiver Example</org_name>
    <email>dmarc@receiver.example</email>
    <report_id>2026-11-07_example.com@receiver.example</report_id>
    <date_range>
      <begin>1794009600</begin>
      <end>1794095999</end>
    </date_range>
  </report_metadata>
  <policy_published>
    <domain>example.com</domain>
    <p>none</p>
  </policy_published>
  <record>
    <row>
      <source_ip>192.0.2.123</source_ip>
      <count>40</count>
      <policy_evaluated>
        <disposition>none</disposition>
        <dkim>fail</dkim>
        <spf>fail</spf>
      </policy_evaluated>
    </row>
    <identifiers>
      <header_from>example.com</header_from>
      <envelope_from>mailer.example.net</envelope_from>
    </identifiers>
    <auth_results>
      <dkim>
        <domain>mailer.example.net</domain>
        <selector>s1</selector>
        <result>pass</result>
      </dkim>
      <spf>
        <domain>mailer.example.net</domain>
        <result>pass</result>
      </spf>
    </auth_results>
  </record>
</feedback>
  1. Open the attachment. RFC 9990 recommends GZIP compression, and the name then ends in .xml.gz.
  2. Check report_metadata. org_name is who sent the report. date_range gives the period in seconds since 1970, in UTC. error, when present, flags problems with your record.
  3. Check policy_published. This is the policy the receiver found. After a DNS change, the dispositions in one report can follow the old policy or a mix of old and new, while policy_published lists a single policy.
  4. Read each record. source_ip is the server that connected, and count is how many messages it sent with these results. One IP can appear in several records. header_from is the domain in the visible From address. envelope_from, when present, is the return-path domain that SPF checked.
  5. Compare auth_results with policy_evaluated. auth_results holds the raw SPF and DKIM results. The dkim and spf values in policy_evaluated show whether a passing domain aligns with header_from, by default the same organizational domain (normally the domain you registered). DMARC passes if either value is pass. In the example, SPF and DKIM pass for mailer.example.net. That domain does not align with example.com, so those 40 messages failed DMARC.
  6. Read disposition. It records what the receiver did: none, quarantine or reject. RFC 9990 adds pass for mail that passed under a quarantine or reject policy. A reason element explains why the receiver departed from your policy, such as local_policy, mailing_list or trusted_forwarder.

What to do with DMARC reports

In the report Likely meaning Action
Known service, pass in auth_results, fail in policy_evaluated It authenticates with its own domain Have it sign DKIM or set the return path with your domain
Known service, fail in both It is not in SPF and does not sign Add it to SPF or set up DKIM with your domain
Unknown IP, fail in both Possible spoofing Do not authorize it
reason is mailing_list or trusted_forwarder Forwarding broke SPF or DKIM Accept some failures: Microsoft calls this normal
  1. Match every source_ip to a service on your list. A reverse DNS lookup can suggest the owner.
  2. Fix legitimate sources first. RFC 9989 requires this before you publish p=quarantine or p=reject. Caution: a second SPF record or more than 10 DNS lookups returns permerror, so SPF stops passing. Publish a new DKIM key in DNS before the service signs with it, or the signature fails.
  3. Watch a full sending cycle. Google says one week is usually enough. RFC 9989 warns it can take many months, depending on how often you send.
  4. Then consider a stricter policy. Caution: p=quarantine and p=reject can send legitimate mail to spam or get it refused. RFC 9989 says domains whose users post to mailing lists should not publish p=reject. Any that do should first run p=none for at least a month and p=quarantine for as long. Before p=reject, sign your mail with aligned DKIM: RFC 9989 says domains at p=reject must not rely on SPF alone, because forwarded mail usually fails SPF.

Confirm it worked

  1. Run the DMARC Checker on your domain and confirm that rua is still there.
  2. Send mail through the service you fixed. In the first report whose date_range begins after the fix, find its source_ip and confirm pass for dkim or spf in policy_evaluated.
  3. Check several reporters. Microsoft puts typical coverage at 70 to 90% of total mail volume, so silence from one receiver tells you little.

Common mistakes

  • Reading auth_results as the DMARC result. SPF can pass there and still fail alignment.
  • Taking disposition for inbox placement. none means DMARC took no action. The standard report has no inbox or spam field, and its counts include mail that other filters ultimately blocked.
  • Relying on ri or pct. RFC 9989 removed both tags. Reports in the older RFC 7489 format can still list pct.
  • Trusting every attachment. RFC 9990 warns that report data may be forged and that malformed files can exhaust a decompressor or XML parser.

Check it now

Look up and validate a DMARC record

Frequently asked questions

How often are DMARC aggregate reports sent?
Usually once a day. RFC 9989 asks receivers to send them at least every 24 hours, and RFC 9990 says a report typically covers one UTC day. Some receivers opt out. You cannot request an interval, because RFC 9989 removed the ri tag.
Do DMARC aggregate reports contain personal data?
RFC 9990 says they carry no individual email addresses, IP addresses of individuals or message content. They list the IP addresses of sending servers and the domains involved. RFC 9989 adds that a report can still reveal sensitive activity at a small organization, so limit who can read that mailbox.
Why does my report show a DMARC fail when SPF passed?
The domain SPF checked does not align with the domain in your From address. Microsoft describes this pattern for services that use their own MAIL FROM domain. Have the service sign DKIM with your domain or use your domain for MAIL FROM. One aligned pass is enough for DMARC.
Can I read a DMARC report without a tool?
Yes, for a few reports. RFC 9989 says a person can read them but recommends parsing them by machine. Google suggests loading the records into a database, converting them to HTML with an XSL style sheet or using a third-party service.

Sources consulted

RFC 9990 §3.1.1.7: record
checked 2026-11-08
RFC 9990 §3.1.1.8: row
checked 2026-11-08
RFC 9990 §3.5.2: Email
checked 2026-11-08

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