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DMARC aggregate report: how to read it and what to do next
A DMARC aggregate report is a daily XML summary of mail using your domain. Read each field, find failing senders and fix them before you enforce.
Before you start
A DMARC aggregate report is an XML file that a receiving mail server sends to the address in your rua tag, usually once a day. It counts the messages that used your domain, grouped by sending IP address, and shows their SPF (authorized servers), DKIM (message signature) and DMARC results.
You need:
-
A DMARC record with a
ruatag. Withoutrua, receivers must not generate reports. A minimal TXT record, published at_dmarc.example.com:TXTv=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
Caution: if a record already exists, edit it and keep its
pvalue. When one name has two DMARC records, receivers discard both. -
A dedicated mailbox or reporting service. An address on another registered domain also needs a permission record on that domain.
-
A list of the services that send as your domain, to compare against each report.
A report typically covers one UTC day, so allow at least one full UTC day after you publish rua.
Steps
How to read a DMARC report
This shortened report follows the RFC 9990 format. Names and numbers are examples.
<feedback xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0">
<report_metadata>
<org_name>Receiver Example</org_name>
<email>dmarc@receiver.example</email>
<report_id>2026-11-07_example.com@receiver.example</report_id>
<date_range>
<begin>1794009600</begin>
<end>1794095999</end>
</date_range>
</report_metadata>
<policy_published>
<domain>example.com</domain>
<p>none</p>
</policy_published>
<record>
<row>
<source_ip>192.0.2.123</source_ip>
<count>40</count>
<policy_evaluated>
<disposition>none</disposition>
<dkim>fail</dkim>
<spf>fail</spf>
</policy_evaluated>
</row>
<identifiers>
<header_from>example.com</header_from>
<envelope_from>mailer.example.net</envelope_from>
</identifiers>
<auth_results>
<dkim>
<domain>mailer.example.net</domain>
<selector>s1</selector>
<result>pass</result>
</dkim>
<spf>
<domain>mailer.example.net</domain>
<result>pass</result>
</spf>
</auth_results>
</record>
</feedback>
- Open the attachment. RFC 9990 recommends GZIP compression, and the name then ends in
.xml.gz. - Check
report_metadata.org_nameis who sent the report.date_rangegives the period in seconds since 1970, in UTC.error, when present, flags problems with your record. - Check
policy_published. This is the policy the receiver found. After a DNS change, the dispositions in one report can follow the old policy or a mix of old and new, whilepolicy_publishedlists a single policy. - Read each
record.source_ipis the server that connected, andcountis how many messages it sent with these results. One IP can appear in several records.header_fromis the domain in the visible From address.envelope_from, when present, is the return-path domain that SPF checked. - Compare
auth_resultswithpolicy_evaluated.auth_resultsholds the raw SPF and DKIM results. Thedkimandspfvalues inpolicy_evaluatedshow whether a passing domain aligns withheader_from, by default the same organizational domain (normally the domain you registered). DMARC passes if either value ispass. In the example, SPF and DKIM pass formailer.example.net. That domain does not align withexample.com, so those 40 messages failed DMARC. - Read
disposition. It records what the receiver did:none,quarantineorreject. RFC 9990 addspassfor mail that passed under aquarantineorrejectpolicy. Areasonelement explains why the receiver departed from your policy, such aslocal_policy,mailing_listortrusted_forwarder.
What to do with DMARC reports
| In the report | Likely meaning | Action |
|---|---|---|
Known service, pass in auth_results, fail in policy_evaluated |
It authenticates with its own domain | Have it sign DKIM or set the return path with your domain |
Known service, fail in both |
It is not in SPF and does not sign | Add it to SPF or set up DKIM with your domain |
Unknown IP, fail in both |
Possible spoofing | Do not authorize it |
reason is mailing_list or trusted_forwarder |
Forwarding broke SPF or DKIM | Accept some failures: Microsoft calls this normal |
- Match every
source_ipto a service on your list. A reverse DNS lookup can suggest the owner. - Fix legitimate sources first. RFC 9989 requires this before you publish
p=quarantineorp=reject. Caution: a second SPF record or more than 10 DNS lookups returnspermerror, so SPF stops passing. Publish a new DKIM key in DNS before the service signs with it, or the signature fails. - Watch a full sending cycle. Google says one week is usually enough. RFC 9989 warns it can take many months, depending on how often you send.
- Then consider a stricter policy. Caution:
p=quarantineandp=rejectcan send legitimate mail to spam or get it refused. RFC 9989 says domains whose users post to mailing lists should not publishp=reject. Any that do should first runp=nonefor at least a month andp=quarantinefor as long. Beforep=reject, sign your mail with aligned DKIM: RFC 9989 says domains atp=rejectmust not rely on SPF alone, because forwarded mail usually fails SPF.
Confirm it worked
- Run the DMARC Checker on your domain and confirm that
ruais still there. - Send mail through the service you fixed. In the first report whose
date_rangebegins after the fix, find itssource_ipand confirmpassfordkimorspfinpolicy_evaluated. - Check several reporters. Microsoft puts typical coverage at 70 to 90% of total mail volume, so silence from one receiver tells you little.
Common mistakes
- Reading
auth_resultsas the DMARC result. SPF can pass there and still fail alignment. - Taking
dispositionfor inbox placement.nonemeans DMARC took no action. The standard report has no inbox or spam field, and its counts include mail that other filters ultimately blocked. - Relying on
riorpct. RFC 9989 removed both tags. Reports in the older RFC 7489 format can still listpct. - Trusting every attachment. RFC 9990 warns that report data may be forged and that malformed files can exhaust a decompressor or XML parser.